This page in one paragraph
On this page we ask: do Dost's sentences that say "its like is elsewhere" come close, in form, to the talk of "many worlds" in physics? The rows "its like is elsewhere" and "the same person in many places" greet each other from a distance; in both, a pattern is thought to be found elsewhere too, but in Dost this is told through creation, in physics through cosmology or branching. In the row "no repetition, but there is a copy", though, they walk separate roads: while Dost says "there is a like, there is no identical", on Tegmark's first level an exact copy of you can be found in an infinite universe, and here we make no choice. We did not look at the rows "the infinity of possibles" and "is multiplicity real or appearance", and we did not tie the account known as "an Adam in each of the seven earths" to Dost. What remains open: whether this closeness really answers the same question, or different questions in the same words, and whether Dost says multiplicity is in forms or in relation.
What is this form?
"There is an Adam here" is easy to say. "Elsewhere too there is another like this one" stops a person. Three separate doors open on this road in Dost's pages.
The first is other places. Beside the earth we live on, a separate earth is spoken of, a land with its own cities and rulers (c1k11, c12k145). The second is likes. Every form has a like in another world; for everything created there are, in the treasuries, likes whose number is not known (c12k147, c13k150). The third is one person being in more than one place. According to the section summary, the idea that one spirit can govern more than one body at the same time is treated (c5k56, summary; no quotation); the substitutes, when they leave a place, leave behind in it someone in their own form (c6k75); the human being is present at every station with a separate form (c10k133).
This third door is near the area of the kalam debates on transmigration and incarnation; we did not enter that debate, we looked only at the form of the sentences. What we call MULTIPLICITY on this page is not the content of these sentences one by one but their form: the same pattern (an Adam, a human being, a form) being found elsewhere too. We set this beside the talk of "many worlds" in physics and ask. The outcome is not known beforehand; we write down both that they stand close and that they part.
One caution: about forty items that fell under Multiplicity are in fact the ranking of the worlds station by station: the Throne, the Footstool, the barzakh, the world of witnessing… We did not take them onto this page. "A many-layered world" and "its like is elsewhere" are separate things. Here we looked only at the second, that is, at the places where likeness and multiplication are told.
What does Dost say?
«We have a form in the Footstool, we have a form in the Throne, we have a form in hayula, we have a form in nature, we have a form in the soul, we have a form in the intellect -these two being expressed as the Pen and the Tablet- we have a form in the Cloud, we have a form in non-existence». (c10k133, Chapter 305, p. 388-389)
Here someone who says "we" says that his own form is present, separately, at countless stations. In the same section (p. 389) these forms are described as a single form reflected in mirrors of different shapes in the nine spheres: when the mirror changes the shape of the image changes, and what is reflected stays one. The text also says that the form at every station has a special face turned toward al-Haqq, even if that station does not know it (p. 390).
Something to notice: the person is one, the places many; and the multiplicity is told not as a "copy" but as an appearing in a mirror. It is distinct enough to raise the question of whether this form can be compared with "the same observer being on many branches" in physics.
«[When a substitute leaves a place] they leave behind there a person in their own form. No one who sees that person doubts that he is the very one who left him. In reality, though, he is not that one» (c6k75, p. 115)
The substitutes, that is, a part of the people of the heart, when leaving a place, leave behind someone in their own form. The one who sees him takes him to be the same person, but the text says "in reality he is not that one". In another section (c5k56) the idea that one spirit can govern more than one body at the same time is treated; these two stand with our own summary, without a quotation.
Something to notice: "the same person" from outside and "not that one" from inside are true at the same time. One has to look at whether the phrase "two copies on two branches" in physics carries exactly this duality.
«These treasuries are in God's Footstool, and the individuals of the likes the treasuries contain are infinite.» (c13k150, p. 153)
Dost says that everything created "in this world, the most perfect of the worlds that could be" has likes in the treasuries of generosity. The same idea is in c12k147 as well: every form in the lower world has a like in the upper world, and unbroken ties stretch between them.
Something to notice: "like" here is not a single like but a community whose individuals are infinite. Moreover the treasury is stored in one place, not in this world. It may be approaching the idea in physics of "everything having a like elsewhere in infinite space"; we weigh this separately below. The motif of "infinite likes" exists in other cosmologies as well (such as Indian and Stoic thought); for this reason specificity has to be tested carefully.
«Therefore in possibility there is nothing more perfect than this world, because there is nothing more perfect than al-Haqq» (c10k133, Chapter 302, p. 357)
The section reaches this conclusion by saying that in possibility only the like of what has appeared can be found. Its answer to the question "can there be other worlds?": what can be is the like of this world; there is nothing above it. In the same Chapter 302 (p. 356) it is said that in the world of witnessing, things other than substances are returned to the unseen and their likes appear.
Something to notice: the question "is there another world?" is tied to the question "is there a better one?" and the answer becomes "there is a like, there is nothing above". In physics, in popular language, this question is asked as "are all possibilities realized?"; in Everett, though, only outcomes with non-zero probability have branches, so the form of the answer is different. The idea that "in possibility there is nothing better than this" also has a lineage known in kalam and philosophy (Ghazali, Leibniz).
«Because of this breadth nothing in existence is repeated, because the possibles are endless» (c16k222, p. 378)
At the station of al-Wasi' (the Vast), the absence of repetition is tied to the infinity of the possibles. The same line is in c10k130 as well: al-Haqq is too exalted to disclose Himself twice in the same form. In c17k223, that those who enter existence are finite while the immutable entities are infinite is told by the example of a ship sinking in the ocean.
Something to notice: these sentences stand in the same place as the sentences saying "its like is elsewhere". There is likeness, there is no repetition. Holding these two together is the subtlest point on this page; when compared with accounts in physics that say "exact copy", the real parting comes out of here.
«This multiplicity arises from different lights.» (c14k162, p. 317-334)
It is told that a single affair comes out of God as one and multiplies in the forms of the world; the multiplication is likened to the form of a person multiplying in many mirrors and shadows. In c16k207, though, it is said that multiplicity is not in existence but in relations and rulings.
Something to notice: the multiplicity on this page can be read from two separate places: is it a real multiplication in forms, or an appearance in relations? The two sentences do not answer this in the same way, and we do not choose.
Returning to the first door, that is, other places: in c1k11 the Earth of Reality is told, through the testimony of a knower, as a barzakh-world created from the surplus of Adam's clay, with its own cities and rulers. This place is separate from the earth of this world. In c12k145, Dost, setting out from the verse "My earth is wide", speaks of an earth that does not change place, not perceptible but intelligible and spiritual.
The account that comes to mind
The saying that came to mind when we began reading is this: in each of the seven earths there is an Adam like Adam, a Noah like Noah, an Abraham like Abraham. This is known as a saying attributed to Ibn Abbas in the exegetical sources. A riwaya means a report transmitted with a chain stating from whom to whom a saying was passed on. We did not examine its chain or its standing; nor did we find in the Futuhat summaries a sentence showing this saying or Dost recalling it. For this reason we do not present it as Dost's word; we only note down what came to our mind.
What is there in physics?
Schlosshauer 2005 — Decoherence and the measurement problem
According to quantum theory, before it is measured a system can be in a state in which several possibilities enter the calculation together (superposition). But when we measure we always see a single result; this disagreement is called the measurement problem. Schlosshauer's article is a review that explains the phenomenon called decoherence and how much it helps with this problem. Decoherence is this: a small system inevitably interacts with its surroundings (air, light, heat), and because of this the traces of the possibilities having existed together, that is, interference, are erased very quickly. This is a matter of experiment and calculation, and is well understood. The article says that this does not by itself close the question "why only one", and examines the main interpretive approaches (Copenhagen, many worlds, hidden variables) within this frame. This part depends on interpretation. [Schlosshauer 2005]
Everett 1957 — Relative state
Quantum theory says that a system develops in time according to a smooth equation. But at the moment of measurement it adds a "collapse" rule beside this: collapse is the additional rule describing how several possibilities come down to a single result at measurement (the measurement problem above). Everett does not like this duality. His proposal: let us drop the collapse rule and describe everything, the observer too, with the same equation. Then after the measurement the observer carries not a single result but a separate state associated with each result. No result is "more real" than the others; each gains meaning relative to the other ("relative state"). This is not an experiment but a theory proposal. Everett did not use the name "many worlds"; this name was given later by others. What stops one is that it is an interpretation that cannot be told apart by ordinary experiment, and that what the word "probability" corresponds to here is still debated. [Everett 1957]
SEP 2024 — The many-worlds interpretation
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry explains one of the answers given to the question of what happens in measurement. According to this interpretation, as a result of measurement one of the possibilities is not chosen and the others erased; each possibility is realized in its own world, and these worlds go on independently of one another. The interpretation puts in no collapse rule added to the equations. The entry says that this is an interpretation, not an experiment, and that it remains contested because it cannot be told apart from other interpretations by experiment. It also explains the objections to the interpretation and the defenses of it; the hardest question is what "probability" means in this frame. That is, the entry gives not a claim but a map of a debate. [SEP: Many-Worlds Interpretation]
Tegmark 2003 — Parallel universes
Tegmark brings together the physical theories that rest on parallel universes and builds a four-level order. At the first level, cosmic inflation theory predicts an infinite universe; in this universe every initial condition is realized somewhere, and according to the author an exact copy of you can also be found somewhere. At the second level, other regions may have different physical constants and dimensions. The third level is the other branches of the wave function of quantum mechanics; the author says this adds nothing qualitatively new. The fourth level is that other mathematical structures give different fundamental equations. According to the author the important question is not whether there are parallel universes but how many levels there are. The conclusion of the first level depends on the assumption that space is infinite; this is an assumption the author defends, and a finite universe too can be compatible with observations. The other levels are more contested. The article discusses how these models can be tested and says that there is a serious "measure problem" in how we are to count the probabilities. [Tegmark 2003]
Bousso 2011 — The multiverse interpretation
This article puts forward a claim: the many worlds of quantum mechanics and the many worlds of the multiverse are two faces of one thing; the authors defend this, they do not present it as a proven finding. The thought they rest on is this: decoherence, that is, the erasing of quantum possibilities through interaction with the environment, depends on which degrees of freedom are kept out of sight; that is, it is to some extent subjective. The authors propose that when we look at the causally accessible region of a measurement event, the "causal diamond", the environment is determined by itself. In this frame the global multiverse is read as the representation of all possible branches in a single geometry. The article says that additional assumptions are needed for probability predictions to be fully testable. This is a theoretical proposal; it is not tested by experiment and is not presented as the shared view of physicists. What stops one is the attempt to unite two different "many worlds" ideas under a single roof. [Bousso 2011]
SEP 2024 — Identity and individuality in quantum theory
The question is: does quantum physics permit us to understand particles as individuals of which we can say "this one" or "that one"? According to the entry, the "received view" that spread in the period when quantum theory was founded says that elementary particles cannot be counted as individuals in this sense. On top of this, special logical systems have been developed that cannot count individuals and construct the concept of identity differently. On the other hand, it has also been argued that quantum physics can nonetheless be compatible with a metaphysics that speaks of individuals; only in that case these individuals are so indistinguishable from one another that Leibniz's principle of "the identity of indiscernibles" is violated. The entry is not an experiment but a philosophical examination; its conclusions are not certain, they are contested. What stops one is that the question "which is which" of two electrons can lose its meaning. [SEP: Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory]
A note on the cat
The many-worlds account is often relayed in popular writing as "a cat both dead and alive" or "a copy of me forks at every choice". The sources we have do not separately discuss the cat example; nor do we go into the details of that example. What the sources say is this: in Everett's proposal every result exists together with the observer's state relative to it, and none is more real than the other; there is no separate "collapse". The SEP entry too explains that every possibility is realized in its own world and that these worlds go on independently of each other. That is, on every branch the observer sees a single result; "seeing two results at once on one branch" is not what this frame says. The popular picture often drops this subtlety. [Everett 1957; SEP: Many-Worlds Interpretation]
What does the secondary literature say?
According to the SEP entry, it is Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi who popularized the term ta'ayyun (determination); the entry describes it as the unlimited Being becoming determinate, limited and defined as it shows itself as "everything other than God", and relays that everything is a ta'ayyun of the Unlimited, while the Unlimited itself is called la ta'ayyun. The entry also relays from Ibn Arabi that the possible things are infinite and that each of them has a particular name of God: since the possibles are infinite the names are infinite too, because with each new appearance of the possibles new relations come. This paragraph is not Dost's word; it is the account of the secondary literature. [SEP: Ibn 'Arabi]
Looking side by side
Its like is elsewhere: greet each other from a distance.
What is shared: on both sides it is thought that a pattern (a human being, an observer, a region) can be found elsewhere too. In Dost every form has a like in another world, and the likes are infinite (c12k147, c13k150); on Tegmark's first level every initial condition is realized somewhere in an infinite universe [Tegmark 2003]. Where they part: in Dost the likes are in separate treasuries and worlds through creation, in physics they are, as a cosmological consequence, in far regions of the same space. Moreover Tegmark distinguishes the kinds of multiverse from one another: those born of inflation, those born of quantum branching, those born of mathematical structure; these are not a single idea of "another world" [Tegmark 2003]. The "no repetition" side of the same pair is written separately below; the two have to be read together. Someone who sees may notice something in the structure of the sentence "there is a like and its number is infinite". Open question: does this closeness come from the shared idea of "everything being found elsewhere too", or from both sides appealing to infinity in the same way?
The same person in many places: greet each other from a distance.
What is shared: the person stays one, the places multiply; in Dost, the human being's separate form at every station (c10k133), the form the substitute leaves behind (c6k75), the heir finding himself in many places and forms at the resurrection (c15k177, summary); in Everett the observer's separate state for each result [Everett 1957]. Where they part: in Everett the branch forks with measurement and the branches go on independently of one another; here the earths are separately created places, and the person is in more than one place as bodies and forms. There is no forking, there is a tie coming through creation from one station to another. Where someone who sees may notice: the duality "the same from outside, not from inside" and the mirror simile. Open question: do "one person, many places" answer the same question on both sides, or only different questions in the same words?
The infinity of the possibles and "there is no better": we did not look at this door.
In Dost the possibles are endless (c16k222, c17k223) and "this world is the most perfect of the worlds that could be" is said (c13k150, c10k133). In physics Tegmark's fourth level counts other mathematical structures [Tegmark 2003], but there is no ranking of superiority there; "in possibility there is nothing better" is a lineage known in kalam and philosophy too. We did not look for this pairing.
No repetition, but there is a copy: they walk separate roads.
What is shared: on both sides the question of identity is open. Here two words are apart: a like is another instance of the same pattern; a copy is an indistinguishable second version. Dost says yes to the like, no to the copy. Where they part: Dost says "al-Haqq does not disclose Himself twice in the same form", "nothing in existence is repeated" (c10k130, c15k169, c16k222); even if there are likes, there is no second instance exactly the same. On Tegmark's first level, though, there is an exact copy of you in an infinite universe [Tegmark 2003]; at the level of particles too the meaning of "which is which" is debated [SEP: Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory]. These two stand in opposite directions; we record this parting as well, and the page makes no choice. Someone who sees, setting Dost's distinction "there is a like, there is no identical" beside the distinction in physics "indistinguishable, but two", may notice something. Open question: does this opposition show that the two languages mean things other than "identity", or is it a real parting?
Is multiplicity real or appearance: we did not look at this door.
Dost says multiplicity in one place as a multiplication in forms (c14k162), in another as an appearance in relation and ruling (c16k207). In physics the question of whether branches are real or a convenience in the calculation makes up the shared ground of Bousso and Schlosshauer [Bousso 2011; Schlosshauer 2005], but we did not try to separate whether the two questions are the same question.
Tempting, but we did not make it.
Tying the saying "an Adam in each of the seven earths" to the many-worlds interpretation or to parallel universes. We found no place showing that the account comes from Dost; we did not want to open a door by the resemblance of words alone (parallel, another world).
Questions we are left with
- Does the saying "seven earths, an Adam in each" occur in the Futuhat? If it does, how?
- At what point does the pair "its like is infinite, it has no repetition" part from the language of "exact copy" in physics?
- If one person being in many places is not forking in Dost, what is this a structure like?
- Can a separate place like the Earth of Reality be read in physics as "another region", or does its being set apart by creation prevent this?
- How can the sentence that says multiplicity is "in relation" and the one that says "multiplication in forms" stand together?
What did we not do?
We did not compare Dost's sentences with the Arabic original. What we read was the site's Turkish section summary, and the quotations are given with the page numbers of the translation. This is not a reading summary but our reading framework; we do not understand Dost, we try to understand.
We are not saying that one thing is identical with another or that one confirms the other. In no row does Dost explain physics, nor does physics confirm Dost. What we see is only a closeness of form, and that stays as a question. The physics side is sourced, but we are not physicists.